H&R Block $HRB, which provides tax preparation and related services to the general public, is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their next annual meeting is September 11, 2014. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of two funds when I checked and voted on 9/7/2014. I also checked the votes of OTPP and CalSTRS. All advance disclosers that I know of except CBIS voted in favor of all items. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 54% of the time and assigned them a proxy score of 54. View Proxy Statement. Read Warnings below. What follows are my recommendations on how to vote the H&R Block proxy in order to enhance corporate governance and long-term value.
Tag Archives | CalSTRS
I’ve previously written two posts on California’s Savings Plus program and how one major contractor, Northern Trust has voted. (Part I & Part II) Below, I compare the votes of Northern Trust on proxy proposals with those recommended by the AFL-CIO. A similar exercise could be performed at any deferred compensation plan.
Shareholders have voting rights, usually one vote per share, to decide who will serve on the board and to advise on pay and other issues. Funds, such as CalPERS and the CalHR Savings Plus program, have a legal duty to ensure shares are voted in the best interest of program participants. Continue Reading →
This is the second of a two part series. Part I discussed proxy voting at Savings Plus, as compared with at CalPERS.
CalHR’s Current RFP for Savings Plus
CalHR recently released a Request for Proposal (RFP 700-14-01) seeking bids for investment management services for Savings Plus. Unfortunately, the RFP fails to require Savings Plus participants be informed of proxy voting policies or decisions. Continue Reading →
Proxy Insight, a brand new service providing the most comprehensive information on the actual voting behaviour of key global shareholders, is currently recruiting for a number of positions as outlined below. If you are interested in applying please send your CV and covering letter to email@example.com: Continue Reading →
Yesterday, I posted a recent letter to the editor of Pensions & Investments praising their editorial, Winning Over Proxy Voters, which argues that institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to announce their proxy votes in advance of annual meetings, if doing so is likely to influence voters. If institutional investors heed their call, it will speed the development of open client director voting (CDV) and more intelligent proxy votes.
As corporate power grows and the power of government falls, mechanisms to govern corporations become more important. As government power falls, their power to regulate corporations falls as well. Further, as the influence of corporations over governments increases (e.g. lobbying) the will of governments to regulate corporations also falls. – CHR for Social Responsibility
Historically, most retail shareowners toss their proxies. During the first year under the “notice and access” method for Internet delivery of proxy materials, less than 6% made use of their proxy votes. Those that do vote own disproportionately more shares (about 25-30% of total retail shares). The voting rate hasn’t improved much, if at all. This contrasts with almost all institutional investors voting, since they have a fiduciary duty to do so. Unfortunately, it isn’t time/cost efficient to read through the entire proxy to vote a few retail shares intelligently. Continue Reading →
Below is an email I sent to Pensions & Investments (P&I) editorial chief Barry Burr praising their editorial enhancing fiduciary duty and opining on how it may speed the arrival of the time when retail investors will vote their values with the simple push of a button or two on their cell phones. I will follow this tomorrow with some additional remarks regarding the advent of open client directed voting, assisted by this expanded fiduciary duty.
Thank you for your important editorial, Winning Over Proxy Voters, which argues that institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to announce their proxy votes in advance of annual meetings, if doing so is likely to influence voters.
Votes are assets. Announcing votes in advance of meetings puts the value of those assets to their full use; announcing votes after the meeting does not. Continue Reading →
Just a brief post to thank shareowners at Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG) for sending a strong message to the company’s board and management. 77% of shares were voted against the executive pay package and a majority supported our proposal to end supermajority voting requirements.
CalSTRS, Florida SBA, AFSCME, Calvert, Domini, Trillium, CBIS, CtW and many others joined to reject the non-binding say-on-pay measure and a proposed stock incentive plan. Both ISS and Glass Lewis recommended their clients vote against the package and the plan. Continue Reading →
California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) Chief Executive Officer Jack Ehnes issued the following statement on the Legislature’s announcement of a plan to move forward with legislation, to be amended in Assembly Bill 611, to close the $71 billion CalSTRS funding shortfall: Continue Reading →
Some have argued that Ralph Nader started socially responsible shareholder activism with Campaign GM, when the group filed shareholder proposals to expand GM’s board to include consumer advocates and empower shareholders to place their board nominees on GM’s proxy ballot (proxy access). According to a recent article in the WSJ, the longtime consumer advocate is now putting together a shareholder-activism group. (Ralph Nader Adds Shareholder Activist to His Portfolio, 1/15/2014) Continue Reading →
Carl Icahn has long championed the interests of shareholders. Yet even many who had watched him for years were surprised by the vehemence of his Wall Street Journal Op-ed after withdrawing from the shareholder vote on Dell’s leveraged buyout. Continue Reading →
Sorry to be late and abbreviated in getting out my coverage of this great forum. Be sure to check out the Forum’s photo gallery, which contains many more and much better shots than what I took between notes and conversations.
The second panel discussed the growing issue of dual-class stock structures. While there was considerable debate, my sense is that most in the room see the advantages of such structures do not outweigh the disadvantages. I would like to see more discussion in the broader press about these issues when dual-class companies are going public. Maybe the discount would be even steeper. Continue Reading →
Stratasys Ltd $SSYS is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 6/21/2013. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three funds when I checked on 5/18/2013. I voted with management 90% of the time. View Proxy Statement.
I’m busy on vacation, so have no time to analyze my proxy. Instead, I’m simply trusting that CalSTRS has done their research and I’m voting right down the line with them. Continue Reading →
Netflix, Inc. ($NFLX) is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 6/7/2013. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of one fund when I checked on 5/25/2013. I voted with management only 10% of the time. View Proxy Statement. NFLX is another supposedly high-tech company with no hyperlinks in their proxy statement. In fact, they don’t even include an index. They either don’t want investors to be able find information or they just don’t care enough to bother. While the stock has risen recently, the company remains risky because of poor corporate governance. Continue Reading →
Cognizant Technology Solutions (CTSH) is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 6/4/2013. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three funds when I checked on 5/23/2013. I voted with management 75% of the time. View Proxy Statement.
Warning: Be sure to vote each item on the proxy. Any items left blank are voted in favor of management’s recommendations. (See Broken Windows & Proxy Vote Rigging – Both Invite More Serious Crime) I generally vote against pay packages where NEOs were paid above median in the previous year but make exceptions if warranted. According to Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Grinstein, Yaniv (The Growth of Executive Pay), aggregate compensation by public companies to NEOs increased from 5 percent of earnings in Continue Reading →
Tesla Motors (TSLA) is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 6/4/2013. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of two funds when I checked on 5/26/2013. I voted with management 33% of the time. View Proxy Statement.
Warning: Be sure to vote each item on the proxy. Any items left blank are voted in favor of management’s recommendations. (See Broken Windows & Proxy Vote Rigging – Both Invite More Serious Crime) I generally vote against pay packages where NEOs were paid above median in the previous year but make exceptions if warranted. According to Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Grinstein, Yaniv (The Growth of Executive Pay), aggregate compensation by public companies to NEOs increased from 5 percent of earnings Continue Reading →