Tag Archives | CII

CII Sticks Up For Retail Investors on Blank Votes, Phony VIF Ballot Titles & Biased Vote Reporting

Has the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) turned over a new leaf or am I only beginning to notice because they recently came out publicly agreeing with me?  Three years ago a group of us petitioned the SEC to clarify that the same rules that apply to proxies also apply to voter information forms, VIFs. The group included Glyn Holton, Mark Latham, Eric M. Jackson, James P. Hawley, Andrew Williams, Andrew Eggers, Bradley Coleman and Erez Maharshak.

Recently, CII wrote to the SEC in support of that position, without explicitly citing our earlier petition. In their April 5 letter, concerned with a proposed rule’s incentives to create “enhance brokers’ internet platforms (EBIPs), CII reminded the SEC that key to the stated intent of the rule was to provide benefits to investors and corporate governance generally. Before moving forward on EBIPs, CII recommends action or clarification on the following: Continue Reading →

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SVDX/Stanford Rock: Two Classes of Common Stock: Qui Bono?

In light of the IPOs and subsequent performances of Facebook, Groupon, Zynga, etc., there has been renewed discussion in Silicon Valley. When two classes of common stock that place control of the board in the hands of the founders and not the investors, do investors benefit or does it just entrench management? One argument in favor of two classes of common stock is that it allows the founders to run the company without interference from activist shareholders who are “short-termers.” One argument against is that a founder who is a poor CEO cannot be removed by the board — and hiring and firing the CEO is the raison d’etre of a corporate board. SVDX‘s panel of seasoned experts hold divergent views on this topic. This program, like all SVDX programs, was subject to the Chatham House Rule. I’ve added a few links that might be helpful. Continue Reading →

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UNFI Vote: Have We Turned the Corner on Annual Elections?

J. McRitchie, UNFI Shareowner

My proposal to declassify the board at United Natural Foods, Inc. ($UNFI) passed by an overwhelming margin of 87.89%:

  • 38,086,048 for
  • 5,248,963 against

See their 8-K filing. Text (pdf) of proposal and opposition. Of course, the margin would have been even higher without insider holdings and blank votes going to management. Have we turned the corner on declassification measures to the point where companies might as well throw-in the towel and declassify when faced with such proposals? Continue Reading →

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UNFI Locked Out ShareOwners but We Voted to Declassify the Board: Company Now Seeks Feedback on Meeting Format

I attended a virtual-only meeting of United Natural Foods, Inc. yesterday and was pleased that a majority of shares were voted in favor of my proposal to declassify the board. That, combined with a move to majority vote requirements for directors a few years ago, helps move UNFI ($UNFI) into the center of the pack with regard to corporate governance. However, I am very disappointed with the lockout style annual meeting. They said they are open to change. Of course, that may depend on shareowners providing feedback. I hope you will join me in requesting changes. I tell you how at the end of this post and I make it a painless cut and paste exercise.   Continue Reading →

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Controlled Companies Carry Negatives

A new study finds that controlled companies – particularly those with multiple classes of shares – generally underperform over the long term. As compared to companies with dispersed ownership, controlled companies experience more stock price volatility, increased material weakness in accounting controls, more related party transactions, and offer fewer rights to unaffiliated shareholders. The study results challenge the notion that multiclass voting structures benefit a company and its shareowners over the long term. Continue Reading →

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Step Into the Corporate Governance Way Back Machine for September

Time to step into the way back machine to see what we were writing about 5, 10 and 15 years ago. Five years ago @ Corporate Governance, I was pleading for readers to send comments to the SEC on their proxy access proposals. 30,000 letters wasn’t enough, in my opinion.

A shareholder proposal calling for a “say-on-pay” vote by shareowners on executive compensation at Activision Inc. (ATVI) filed by As You Sow received 69% of the vote at the company’s annual meeting held in Beverly Hills, California.  This may be the highest vote result so far of about 50 say-on-pay proposals voted on by shareowners this year.  Activision is a publisher of video games including Quake, Doom and Guitar Hero, and is currently all the news for its purchase of Bizarre Creations Ltd., the UK studio behind the popular Project Gotham Racing title. (Activision to Purchase U.K.’s Bizarre Creations, WSJ, 9/27/07) Conrad MacKerron, Director, Corporate Social Responsibility Program at the As You Sow Foundation, criticized the company for providing outrageous perks like paying the mortgages, Medicare taxes, and even pet-sitting for executives.  Continue Reading →

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Companies Use Range of Arguments to Exclude Proxy Access Proposals

Of the 16 proxy access proposals filed by proponents in 2012 and listed on the ISS Checklist, eight are being challenged at the SEC. Ferro, Hewlett-Packard, Nabors Industries, CME Group, Pioneer Natural Resources, Staples and Charles Schwab have not sought no-action relief from proposals at the commission, according to data from ISS. Conversely, Bank of America, Chiquita Brands International, MEMC Electronic Materials, Sprint Nextel, Textron, Goldman Sachs, Western Union and Wells Fargo have asked the SEC for permission to omit the proposals. Continue Reading →

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CII Contract with Equilar a Positive Step But More Needed to Address Pay Issue

Equilar, the leading provider of executive compensation benchmarking and research solutions, announced the release of its Pay-For-Performance Analytics suite yesterday, along with the fact that the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), whose members hold $3 trillion in assets, has signed on as the first client. According to the press release:

By combining an innovative market-based algorithm to identify peer companies with a realizable pay methodology using long Continue Reading →

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Support Grows for Transparency in Corporate Political Spending

A group of 43 House Democrats is urged the SEC to require public companies to disclose their political contributions. The Council of Institutional Investors also sent a comment letter on a petition (File Number 4-637) filed by prominent law professors.

Rep. Gary Ackerman (D., N.Y.) and 42 other House colleague argue the high court’s ruling in the case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, was “misguided” and left shareholders “completely in the dark, unaware that their money could be funding political attack ads.”

Shareholders cannot hold corporate management accountable for decisions the shareholders never knew were made. The present system is undemocratic and untenable.

Shortly after the decision, Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY) introduced the Corporate Politics Transparency Act, which would require corporations Continue Reading →

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SEC Fails to Appeal on Proxy Access

The SEC will not challenge the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 10-1305, which struck down the agency’s rule to make it easier for shareowners to nominate directors to corporate boards.

The announcement, made late on Tuesday by SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, marks a major blow to large investor advocacy groups. In a statement, Schapiro said the SEC has no plans to seek a rehearing before the appeals court or a Supreme Court review. But she said she remains “committed to finding a way to make it easier for shareholders to nominate candidates to corporate boards.” (SEC will not seek rehearing on proxy access rule, 9/6/2011)

Given the composition of the DC Circuit and the Supreme Court, perhaps such an appeal would have had little chance. However, by letting the decision stand the SEC now faces a bad precedent. As a letter from the Council of Institutional Investors pointed out:

It is well-settled “that ‘a court is not to substitute Continue Reading →

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HP Nomination Committee Under Fire

I recently got this from an anonymous member (here are related thoughts from Cydney Posner and Marty Lipton):

You may have seen the stories regarding ISS’ recommendation that shareholders withhold against the entire Hewlett-Packard nominating committee for the way new directors were selected. I haven’t seen the ISS report, but the news stories (eg. WSJ article) probably describe it pretty well.

At issue seems to be the fact that five new directors of H-P were identified by an ad hoc committee, which according to H-P’s proxy statement “consisted of the CEO and three non-employee directors, which was formed in November 2010 to assist in identification of new director candidates and to facilitate the process of evaluating those candidates as potential directors.”

ISS and Glass Lewis criticize the addition of the CEO to this committee, since only the independent directors of the Nominating and Governance Committee are supposed to responsible for director nominations. While CEOs play a role in nominations, it does seem unusual to formally include the CEO on the search committee. It likely also didn’t help that, as according to this Bloomberg article, many of the new directors had connections to the CEO. None of those relationships are disclosed in the proxy, as much of it relates to the CEO’s former company.

In additional soliciting materials filed on Friday, H-P responds to ISS’s recommendation. (How You Find New Directors: “True Independence” Under the Microscope – TheCorporateCounsel.net Blog, 3/14/2011)

Go to theCorporateCounsel.net/Blog article to read the links. I highly recommend the one by Cydney Posner. Personally, I come down on the side of ISS on this one, although their action might have been better with some warning. At least now other companies have it. Don’t involve your CEO in a search committee pre-screening candidates. And some people wonder why shareowners favor split chair/CEO positions and proxy access.

Taking a quick glance at CII corporate governance policies, the action at H-P appears to be at least an attempt to circumvent:

2.5   All-independent Board Committees:  Companies should have audit, nominating and compensation committees, and all members of these committees should be independent.  The board (not the CEO) should appoint the committee chairs and members…

7.2   Basic Definition of an Independent Director: An independent director is someone whose only nontrivial professional, familial or financial connection to the corporation, its chairman, CEO or any other executive officer is his or her directorship.  Stated most simply, an independent director is a person whose directorship constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation.

Much more from J. Robert Brown Jr. on this subject at theRacetotheBottom.org under “The Myth of an Independent System for Nominating Directors” in several posts.

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Join ShareOwners.org's Campaign to Save SEC & CFTC Budgets

A major Web-based campaign to save the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) from the impact of proposed budget cuts will be launched at 1 p.m. Wednesday (February 16, 2011) by ShareOwners.org in cooperation with the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and the Council of Institutional Investors (CII).

The U.S. House is currently looking to slash budgets of the SEC and CFTC, which would be forced to scale back operations and dismiss hundreds of employees at the same time they are seeking to implement pro-investor reforms mandated by the last Congress in the wake of the recent U.S. financial crisis.

The new campaign, spearheaded by ShareOwners.org, will mobilize small and large investors to get actively involved in urging Congress to avoid making cuts that would cripple the leading federal agencies responsible for ensuring that America’s financial markets operate in a fair and open fashion. The new effort by ShareOwners.org is one of a number of emerging pushes by a variety of important groups to protect investors and the integrity of the capital markets by shielding the SEC and CFTC against unwarranted budget cuts. (ShareOwners.org To Launch Major Campaign To Save SEC, CFTC in the Face of Budget Cut Proposals – FierceFinance)

News event speakers will be:

  • Tracy Stewart, executive director, ShareOwners.org;
  • Barbara Roper, director of investor protection, Consumer Federation of America; and
  • Jeff Mahoney, general counsel, Council of Institutional Investors.

Phone-based news conference (with full, two-way Q&A) at 1 p.m. EST on Wednesday, February 16, 2011 by dialing 1 (800) 860-2442. Ask for “Save the SEC/CFTC Campaign” news event. A streaming audio replay of the news event will be available on the Shareowner’s Website as of 4 p.m. EST on February 16, 2011.  Please join in this important effort to keep the SEC and CFTC strong. Regulations mean little, without enforcement.

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CII Files Brief Supporting SEC Proxy Access Rule

The Council of Institutional Investors filed a brief strongly supporting the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) “proxy access” rule, rebutting claims of business groups seeking to overturn the rule.

The Council’s CII TIAA-CREF et al amicus brief 01-27-11, filed with TIAA-CREF and 14 other pension funds, was submitted January 27 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Securities and Exchange Commission.

“Proxy access will make companies more responsive to their shareowners and more vigilant in their oversight of management,” said Ann Yerger, executive director of the Council of Institutional Investors, an association of public, union and corporate pension funds with combined assets in excess of $3 trillion. “This basic shareowner right is widely accepted in many countries. U.S. investors deserve this same, fundamental protection.”

Proxy access gives shareowners a meaningful voice in corporate board elections by letting them place their nominees for director on the company’s proxy card when they are dissatisfied with the board and want to run their own candidates. This allows investors to avoid the often-prohibitive cost of distributing their own proxy materials to other shareowners. The SEC last August approved a rule granting certain long-term investors proxy access at U.S. public companies. But the rule was not put into effect because of the Business Roundtable-Chamber lawsuit.

The Council’s brief argues that the benefits of proxy access far outweigh the costs, citing enhanced communication between investors and management in countries where proxy access is permitted. The increased dialogue “keeps directors in touch with market sentiment which strengthens board independence, reduces risk surprises and improves corporate governance,” the Council and pension funds contend. The brief also dismisses business claims that the proxy access rule will saddle corporate boards with special-interest nominees

See also, CalPERSattachment-CIIpublicationEqualAccess (an attachment to a CalPERS Board meeting agenda from years ago).

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Video Friday: This Week in the Boardroom, Proxy Access Stalled

Boardmember.com is a great source for corporate governance videos every week. TK Kerstetter, President, Corporate Board Member does a good job with his interviews, such as the 11/11/2010 one with Thomas Quaadman, VP, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (This Week in the Boardroom – 11/11/10 – Boardmember.com) However, the guests and chatter too frequently reveal a bias towards management.

Directors are elected by shareowners, yet on This Week in the Boardroom we are much more likely to hear from the Chamber of Commerce than from the Council of Institutional Investors. Isn’t it about time than shareowners had access to the boardroom? Access to the proxy has been delayed. That’s no reason to delay access to this important weekly news show.

See also Corporate Board Member’s recent discussion with Brian Cartwright, former general counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission and senior advisor, Latham & Watkins LLP, about the 2011 proxy season and what boards can do to prepare for the possible passage of proxy access. (Talking Points: Proxy Access Stalled But Still Important for Boards to Consider)

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Proxy Access on Hold

The SEC placed proxy access on hold and will ask the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for an “expedited review” of a legal challenge by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, according to a legal order posted on the agency’s website today. The move means rules allowing shareholders to nominate directors on corporate ballots won’t take effect Nov. 15 as planned. (SEC Delays Rules Easing Ouster of Directors Amid Review of Legal Challenge, Bloomberg, 10/4/10)

According to the SEC filing:

The Commission has discretion to grant a stay of its rules pending judicial review if it finds that “justice so requires.”…

the Commission has determined to exercise its discretion to stay Rule 14a-11 and related amendments to the Commission’s rules, including the amendment to Rule 14a-8, pending resolution of petitioners’ petition for review by the Court of Appeals.
The Commission finds that, under all of the circumstances of this matter, a stay of Rule 14a-11 and related rule amendments is consistent with what justice requires. Among other things, a stay avoids potentially unnecessary costs, regulatory uncertainty, and disruption that could occur if the rules were to become effective during the pendency of a challenge to their validity. Because the Commission and petitioners will seek expedited review of petitioners’ challenge, questions about the rules’ validity will be resolved as quickly as possible.
The Commission further finds that, under all of the circumstances of this matter, it is consistent with what justice requires to stay the effectiveness of the amendment to Rule 14a-8 adopted contemporaneously with Rule 14a-11 because the amendment to Rule 14a- 8 was designed to complement Rule 14a-11 and is intertwined, and there is a potential for confusion if the amendment to Rule 14a-8 were to become effective while Rule 14a-11 is stayed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, pursuant to Exchange Act Section 25(c)(2) and Administrative Procedure Act Section 705, that the motion of petitioners filed on September 29, 2010 for a stay of the effect of Commission Rule 14a-11 and related amendments pending resolution of petitioners’ petition for review by the Court of Appeals be, and hereby is, granted; and it is further
ORDERED, pursuant to Exchange Act Section 25(c)(2) and Administrative Procedure Act Section 705, that the amendment to Commission Rule 14a-8 adopted on August 25, 2010 is stayed pending resolution of petitioners’ petition for review by the Court of Appeals.

“While we are disappointed in the delay, it is not the end of the world,” said Amy Borrus, deputy director of the Council of Institutional Investors. “The Council and concerned investors have pressed for years for this basic shareowner right. A few more months’ wait will not make a big difference.  Given the timing of the rule approval and publication in the Federal Register, it was already a stretch for active investors to use access in the 2011 proxy season. We look forward to expedited resolution of this case because of the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the rules as a result of the litigation. We continue to believe that access to the proxy is a fundamental shareowner right and that it will make boards of U.S. public companies more responsive to shareowners and more diligent in their oversight of management.” (The SEC Puts Proxy Access Rule on Hold, RMG Blog, 10/4/10)

As one who petitioned for proxy access in 2002, this delay looks appropriate for 14a-11 filings and, I suppose, 14a-8 resolutions also must be stayed because 14a-11 becomes the floor. Hopefully, we will have a clear route to access before the 2012 proxy season. I’m glad I didn’t spend a lot of time working on language for 14a-8 resolutions.

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Protesting Symantec's All-Virtual Meeting

Steven Towns, writing for Seeking Alpha (Questioning Symantec’s ‘Virtual’ Shareholder Meetings, 9/20/2010) joined CII, CalSTRS, CalPERS, USPX and others in objecting to an all virtual meeting held buy Symantec. This follows up on Ted Allen’s September 16, 2010 article for RiskMetrics, Investors Object to Symantec’s Virtual Annual Meeting, my post of September 7, 2010 (also on Shareowners.org) and USPX’s page of resources on the issue with copies of letters sent.

Bruce Herbert of Newground Social Investment tuned in to the meeting and apparently found it frustrating. I’ll give it a few days to see if anyone else in the press reports on the virtual-only meeting or maybe Herbert will blog about it. If not, I’ll give Symantec at least one more post. I urge all readers and all funds to write to Ms. Corcos of Symantec protesting the virtual-only meeting. Please cc USPX. See this USPX page for sample letters.

In an e-mail to me and others, Corcos indicated “Symantec received a Low Concern rating on each of the four categories that RMG evaluates:  Board Structure, Compensation, Shareholder Rights and Audit.”  Maybe RMG also needs to hear from shareowners.

Corcos goes on to say: “If stockholders preferences change, we will reconsider hybrid models for future meetings.” I take that to mean, if enough protest they will switch to a hybrid model. Shareowners should keep bombarding them with letters and e-mails until they publicly announce next year’s meeting will be a hybrid one. That will deter other companies from moving to virtual-only meetings.

Gary Lutin’s Shareholder Forum has done a great deal to date trying to come to grips with the various issues through his leadership and that of Avital Louria Hahn. I anticipate USPX, which intends to hold additional ongoing forums on the topic, will build on their work and extend it, developing a broad consensus among shareowners of best practices.

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CII Reports on CDV

The Council of Institutional Investors published an independent assessment of client directed voting, a topic that is under consideration by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as part of its wide-ranging review of the U.S. proxy system.

The paper was written by Alan Beller, Janet Fisher and Rebecca Tabb of the law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. While the paper will inform the comment letter that the Council plans to submit to the SEC on its concept release on the proxy system, it is an independent study and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Council or its members. The white paper on client directed voting is posted here on the Publications page of the Council’s Web site.

I gave it a quick read. At least they clearly see the danger in a likely reversion back to broker votes if going with the proposal from Stephen Norman. I don’t see much likelihood of support for changes that will help fund vehicles leading to more informed voting and I’m not real happy with the characterization of a single page from Broadridge being labeled “The most advanced thinking.” (page 6)

The report gives voting in elections substantially more force than voting in the market by buying or selling shares. I’m not sure that’s true.

Disclosure and conflicts of interest would appear to be issues that need to be addressed as we discuss in Part IV. Second, if an investor who has not made informed investment decisions (or whose agent does not) loses money, other investors and the company generally do not suffer the consequences. The same may not be true in the exercise of voting rights insofar as a substantial uninformed vote (or misinformed vote, if the voting mechanism failed to protect against fraud or conflicts of interest) can influence the outcome of a ballot item. (page 9)

Interesting discussion of Rules 14a-1 and -2. Looks to me like changes are needed. According to the report, “A robust CDV model is likely to have a long gestation period.” Better to leave it alone while systems build than to implement a closed system with limited options. See An Open Proposal for Client Directed Voting, HLS Forum CorpGov & FinReg, 7/14/10 and Investor Group Releases Paper on Client-Directed Voting, RMG, Ted Allen, 9/1/10.

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CII's Most Recent Comment Letter on Proxy Access

SEC Set to Open Up Proxy Process (WSJ, 8/5/10) As reported last week, the meeting is apparently scheduled for August 25.

Under the language being drafted, shareholders would have to own a 3% stake in a company for at least two years to qualify.

As I write this, the SEC still has not confirmed the August 25th meeting date. However, I did spot this August 3rd letter from CII, which reiterates their position that access be based on

at least three percent of a company’s voting stock, to nominate less than a majority of the directors. Eligible investors must have owned the stock for at least two years.

The SEC appears to be endorsing the 3% threshold and 2 year holding requirement of CII. While it isn’t clear how the SEC’s final rule will handle proxy access at small companies, in my opinion that is where it is most needed.

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Mercer's Responsible Investment Update

Mercer’s Responsible Investment Newsletter (June 15, 2010) outlines preliminary results of integrating ESG analysis into global equity portfolios.

Our analysis of the beta of ESG integration has so far been quite positive – ESG factors are material and integrating these factors into investment decision-making can reduce investment risk without sacrificing return…

Initial analysis on adding alpha to a global equity portfolio through a tilt towards sustainable themes, indicates the following:

  • A portfolio with a tilt towards sustainable themes has a higher risk/reward ratio versus a broad market index, but has mixed results when versus a comparable themed index.
  • In the sustainable themed space, the risk of bubbles and strategies’ short track records make manager selection key.
  • The themes of renewable energy and water so far show strong return potential versus the broader market.

The Newsletter also addressed the fatalism of many investors, including large funds, who doubt their proxy vote can make a difference, providing several examples to refute that assertion. Even if you are not ready to take the plunge into “active” ownership, Mercer argues an interim step, “informed” ownership. “This could be defined simply as being satisfied, through due diligence, that votes are being cast in the best long-term interests of the end client or owner.”

Of course, Mercer offers due diligence on investment managers, including evaluation of resources and processes dedicated to proxy voting and ESG issues. They also cite membership organizations, such as the Council of Institutional Investors, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment.

Around the world, institutional investors work hard to achieve the best long-term returns for their clients, participants or beneficiaries. We believe that voting and constructive engagement with companies and peer organizations can help mitigate company specific risks for which investors may not be compensated. There is also reason to believe that more shareholder participation over time can raise the bar for corporate governance in the broader market and improve beta. If your organization agrees with these arguments, then voting and engagement may be a low cost way to help achieve these results.

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Corporate Accountability, Web 2.0 & CorpGov Functions at Public Funds

Bill Baue and Marcy Murninghan have authored a recent working paper that deserves wide circulation and thoughtful consideration. The Accountability Web: Weaving Corporate Accountability and Interactive Technology can be downloaded from the website of the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Since I’m trying to get you to read the paper, I’ll provide just a small taste. Then I’ll show how it might be applied to the corporate governance functions at public pension funds, as an example.  Let’s start with a very abbreviated version of the introduction in the Executive Summary:

Corporate accountability and Web 2.0 share a common thread: both are rooted in interaction and thrive on engagement. This overlap creates opportunities for corporate accountability and Web 2.0 to join forces to create mutual benefits for firms and their stakeholders. However… current business use of Web 2.0 tools focused more on improving performance and increasing efficiencies inside the firm, and on brand management, customer relations, or crisis management outside it.

At a time when our economy is navigating a crisis, and public trust of business activity is in short supply, the intersection of concerns about corporate sustainability, accountability, transparency, and ethics with the proliferation of Web 2.0 communication tools offers an opportunity for new forms of collaborative leadership and participation… an evolution in the concept of who is “inside” and who is “outside” the organization.

Accountability 1.0 is marked by one-way proclamations, campaigns, and PR communications. Accountability 2.0 rests on the assumption of two-way communication, cooperation, and mutual engagement.

Almost anyone will find the tale they weave informative, even entertaining. For example, from a section titled “The Progression of Corporate Accountability,” they start with what may be the first case of stakeholder activism, soon after the Dutch East India Company launched their initial public offering.

Dutch religious pacifists, appalled by the reliance of the company’s business model on the “generous application of warfare, blockade, piracy, assassination, imprisonment, plunder, terror, slavery, [and] bribery,” campaigned by lamplight house-to-house to gather signatures for a notarized public petition, to boycott investment, and to make a show of selling shares in protest (Baue 2008; Davis et al. 2006:175-6).

Let’s take a quick look at the paper’s recommendations, greatly abbreviated here:

  1. Adapt, Don’t Just Adopt. Don’t just extend your existing model, use Web 2.0 for engagement/dialogue to enhance accountability.
  2. Cultivate Participation. Build community and technology in parallel; don’t assume if you build it, they will come.
  3. Develop Clear Terms of Engagement. Electronic media is susceptible to misunderstanding. Set guidelines for critiquing practices and policies, not people. Use assessment and feedback mechanisms to identify keys to success and flag problems.
  4. Foster Mutual Accountability. Model self-accountability, when asking other parties to hold themselves accountable, to create a culture of mutual accountability.
  5. Use Blended Engagement. Augment Web-based communication with face-to-face meetings, choosing the medium based on which is most likely to serve the objectives.
  6. Broaden the Media Palette. Social networking, augmented reality (AR) and wikis tools may be pushing the envelope too quickly, try them internally first to unfreeze thinking.
  7. Build Communities of Inquiry and Practice.  Utilize experts with experience in building communities of inquiry and practice to convene, facilitate, moderate, and/or curate online engagement.

Like corporations navigating the financial crisis, public trust of public pension funds is also in short supply. Many have suffered scandals around placement agents, face huge deficits because of falling portfolio values, are resented by taxpayers who have lost their own defined benefit plans, and are always vulnerable to funded attack by money managers who want the profits that would incur if public employees were converted to defined contribution plans.  The most powerful adversaries of public pension fund might be organizations, like the Business Roundtable and the US Chamber of Commerce, that represent top corporate managers. The more coordinated and powerful shareowners are, the likely directors will represent their interests in corporate boards rather than acceding to every whim of management. The percentage of the profits taken by top management has gone from about 5% to 10%. It isn’t hard to imagine they want to keep it and public pension funds have taken a leadership role in weakening the power of the imperial CEO… for example, by advocating the roles of CEO and board chair be split.

Public employees want to keep their defined benefit plans. They know their pension funds are under attack but they often have little understanding of how corporate governance plays a role in the earnings of their plans or the dynamics of initiatives, legislation and other attacks that may be orchestrated by forces not easily identified, especially after the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. Web 2.0 and Accountability 2.0 could offer public funds a way to integrate their corporate governance concerns about sustainability, accountability, transparency, and ethics with their own internal governance.  These tools offer an opportunity for new forms of collaborative leadership and participation with their own stakeholders… an evolution in the concept of who is “inside” and who is “outside” the organization. By utilizing such tools, funds may not only increase the understanding of stakeholders (which might expand beyond unions and direct members to taxpayers and others) but they may also benefit from what Baue and Murninghan call “cultivating communities of inquiry and practice.”

Now let’s try to apply these recommendations to the corporate governance functions of public pension funds. At some funds, these functions may be largely contracted out or carried out by one individual. Other funds may have dozens of contractors as well as dozens of in-house staff. Therefore, I’ll divide them into basic and expanded activism practices. Most of these practices will be Web and Accountability 1.0 but some will move into 2.0 and be informed by the paper. I’m drawing heavily for large portions of the list from Council of Institutional Investor (CII) publications.

Basic Activism Practices

  1. Obtain useful information necessary to make activism decisions;
  2. Commit staff time to implementing an activism strategy;
  3. Adopt proxy voting guidelines that follow or improve upon a recognized corporate governance framework (see those of  CII and CalPERS, for an example);
  4. Make the proxy voting guidelines available for public comment prior to adoption… using a 2.0 strategy, provide for and cultivate interactive comment and discussion, reaching out to unions and other interested parties who are also connected with members and taxpayers;
  5. Make sure fund proxies are voted by fund staff or by a specialized proxy voting service in accordance with the fund’s proxy voting guidelines;
  6. Adopt a process to handle “No” votes on directors;
  7. Provide for an override mechanism so the fund can vote individual proxies on a case-by-case basis, even if voting is otherwise delegated;
  8. Factor into share lending practices a mechanism to retain voting rights on a targeted basis;
  9. Obtain and post on the web an annual report on the fund’s proxy votes… using more of a 2.0 strategy, facilitate comment and discussion again after the fact, since there are often unanticipated proposals each year and we often learn a lot during proxy season;
  10. Disclose the fund’s proxy voting guidelines on the web site, or alternatively on CII or other web site;
  11. Go public with issues or views on proxy votes through press releases, Twitter, a blog or other mechanisms that move toward 2.o;
  12. Withhold votes from directors of specific companies and/or committees;
  13. .

    Expanded Activism Practices

  14. Develop a methodology and strategy for communicating and engaging with portfolio company directors or executives… making use of pre-season webinars and other 2.0 mechanisms as forms of blended engagement to reach out to more companies efficiently;
  15. Coordinate action with, or support the actions of other shareowners through international networks like ICGN, national networks like CII, as well as state and local networks like the Los Angeles Area Pension Trustees Network;
  16. Weigh in with Congress, the SEC and others to improve investors’ legislative and regulatory environment… use or work with constituent groups to use web-based tools for electronic messaging and other advocacy efforts;
  17. Monitor the discretionary voting by investment managers of shares held for other clients to ensure alignment;
  18. File binding and/or precatory shareowner proposals… foster mutual accountability by modeling self-accountability before introducing proposals that are also applicable to fund governance;
  19. Solicit support (not proxies) for shareowner proposals or opposition to management proposals;
  20. Disclose shareholder initiatives to stakeholders and the public… solicit feedback and dialogue from stakeholders though surveys, webinars and other methods before filing to ensure support or at least acquiescence;
  21. Use contract provisions based on standards of behavior to ensure that financial advisors are responsive to corporate governance principles;
  22. Employ managers and investment consultants who build shareowner value by emphasizing corporate governance reforms as part of their investment strategy;
  23. Use the legal system, such as filing class-action suits under the “lead plaintiff” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 (see On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance by Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch);
  24. Work with CII members and others to develop a backbench of potential director candidates with a wide variety of skill sets;
  25. Disclose proxy votes in advance of AGMs on web site, through RSS feeds, ProxyDemocracy.org, MoxyVote.com, and other such sites as the develop;
  26. Develop your reputation as a voting “brand” (see Proxy Voting Brand Competition at http://votermedia.org/publications). One way to enhance your brand is to provide a brief reason for your vote. As sites compiling votes become more popular, canned votes and reasons will sway fewer votes as disclosures become more sophisticated and value their brand following;
  27. Develop education tools and games to help members with investments to supplement their pensions making use of mutual fund activism comparisons like those available at ProxyDemocracy.org;
  28. Use Twitter and/or a blog to broadcast votes and invite discussion, especially from stakeholders;
  29. Build communities around fund activism that will provide feedback, identifying success and flagging problems;
  30. Run a short slate of directors;
  31. Campaign to deny management a quorum in especially circumstances where the rules or procedures are inherently unfair (see Guest Commentary From Glyn Holton: Emergency at Intel and Intel Virtual Mtg Out for 2010 But Exploring Future with USPX
  32. Utilize corporate governance measures as part of an overall investment strategy. For example, GMI and The Corporate Library have both done studies showing that an index of funds weighted by certain corporate governance measures (mostly measuring risk) should lead to outperformance over traditional indexing;
  33. Work with the SEC to encourage the development of proxy advisory firms (PAFs) by amending rule 14a-8(i)8 to allow shareowner proposals that would allocate corporate funds to PAFs that undertake to offer proxy voting advice, including advice on director nominees, that is made freely available to all of a companies shareowners. See examples from Mark Latham that could be substantially modified based on more recent experience with university and municipal governance to make them more easily implemented. For more recent language, click here (Consider that RiskMetrics probably spends an average of less than $4,000 researching each proxy and think about how much more company specific recommendations can be made if $50,000 is allocated to PAFs by shareowners, partially from corporate funds.);
  34. Model self-accountability to your own stakeholders in ways similar to how you think corporations should be responsible to shareowners by transitioning from one-way communication to two-way or multi-directional interactivity.
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Annual Meeting Horror Stories

The Council of Institutional Investors wants your horror stories on barriers to annual shareowner meeting attendance. We’ve been hearing that companies seem to be making investors jump through more and more hoops to attend annual meetings. If you have any horror stories that will help Council staff identify and discourage unreasonable barriers to attending annual shareowner meetings, please notify Council staffer Justin Levis.

Nell Minow told a recent audience, MAXXAM once “moved their annual meeting from Houston, a city you can fly to, to a small city in Texas, Huntsville, that is impossible to reach. They also set the meeting for 8 in the morning and bought up all of the hotel rooms in town. And then they had the chutzpah to put in the proxy, ‘We look forward to seeing as many of you as possible at the annual meeting.’” John Chevedden tells me that some serous shareowners actually rented a motor home in order to attend the MAXXAM meeting.

Your story doesn’t have to be that bad to be worthy of passing on to CII. Of course, I’d appreciate letting our readers know about them too.

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CorpGov Bites

“Bank of America persuaded the SEC to drop “proxy access” provision as they negotiated a $150 million settlement of a lawsuit tied to the takeover of Merrill Lynch & Co… The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents more than 3 million companies, has said “activist shareholders” would use proxy access to hijack elections to pursue “political or social issues.”” (SEC Said to Push BofA Proxy Rule in Enforcement Case, Bloomberg.com, 2/18/10)  “SOX substantially beefed up the obligations of the audit committee, at least for Exchange traded companies.  See Section 301 of SOX.  The committee was given the direct authority to supervise and to hire/fire the outside auditor.  The committee was also given the authority to hire counsel without full board approval.” “In the proposed settlement with BofA, the SEC is seeking to augment the authority of the audit committee one more time.  The Commission is giving to the audit committee (not the full board) the authority to hire counsel.  Counsel must not only review filings but must discuss possible deficiencies with the audit committee in executive session, without the presence of the non-indpendent directors.  The latter restriction is significant.” (The Board of Directors and a Review of Corporate Disclosure, theRacetotheBottom.org, 2/17/10)

Interesting, Bloomberg failed to get the Chamber’s new line. “Late last month, for the first time in more than a decade, the US Chamber of Commerce changed the boilerplate language that appears at the bottom of its press releases. The nation’s largest business lobby no longer claims to be “representing more than 3 million businesses and organizations of every size, sector, and region.” Instead, it claims to be “representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses” (emphasis added). The smallness of the tweak masks its major significance: Representing somebody, which strongly implies a direct relationship, is very different from representing their interests. The Chamber is in effect acknowleging that the “3 million” businesses aren’t actually its members… It was forced to admit that its true membership isn’t the 3 million businesses that it has claimed, but something on the order of 300,000.” (Chamber of Commerce No Longer “Represents” 3 Million Businesses, Mother Jones, 2/12/10)

I guess we at CorpGov.net should be claiming to represent the interests of the approximately 100 million Americans who own stocks or mutual funds… but why stop at Americans, since we occasionally cover corporate governance issues in other countries as well?

Apple, lags industry peers on sustainability reporting and has not made public greenhouse gas reduction commitments. Apple shareowners are beginning to vote their proxies on Moxy Vote, based on recommendations from Calvert Investments to support a resolution on on sustainability reporting. (Is Apple green enough?, Mac News)  The problem is there is another proposal seeking a bylaw requiring a board committee on sustainability… and there are all those directors to vote for or against. While I love Moxy Vote and own Apple stock, at this point, in Beta form, I’m disappointed the site has no one to advise me on how to vote the other issues or on the directors. So, I turn to ProxyDemocracy.org and even they have collected no votes in advance of the 2/25/10 meeting from “ten institutional investors that are particularly engaged in corporate governance.” I’ll wait until next week to vote.

Eric Jackson does a nice job interviewing John Gillespie and David Zweig, co-authors of “Money for Nothing.”  Gillespie says we won’t have real change until the old players like Bernanke, Geithner and Summers leave. Zweig says, “corporate governance needs a new name to encourage change, maybe corporate democracy.” (Corporate Governance Role in Meltdown, TheStreet.com, 2/17/10) See my review under the heading Fix the Boards – Fix the System. Buy the book.

“Advocates of genocide-free investing won another important victory this week, when American Funds, a family of mutual funds with more than $775 billion in investments, decided to divest virtually all its holdings in PetroChina. Before a shareowner meeting held on November 24, American Funds owned 167 million shares in PetroChina, worth $190 million.”  “Investors Against Genocide advanced a resolution asking that the Board of American Funds “institute procedures to prevent holding investments in companies that…substantially contribute to genocide or crimes against humanity.” American Funds opposed the measure, and affirmative votes for the proposal ranged from 8.5% to 11.8% at the meeting.” (American Funds Sells PetroChina Holdings, SocialFunds.com, 2/18/10) The showing on their resolution would have probably been much higher had voting instructions issued by Broadridge actually complied with the requirements for proxies to clearly indicate the voting topic instead of simply referencing “a shareholder proposal described in the proxy statement.” Broadridge could get away with it because that the language the issuer wanted and since Broadridge uses a voter information form, they don’t feel they are bound by SEC requirements that apply to proxies. (see our coverage of that issue at Investors Against Genocide Fighting American Funds, Broadridge and Vague SEC Requirements: More Problems Solved Using Direct Registration.

Corporate governance advisory firm PIRC made history again. In January 2009 they took a radical step, and began publicly disclosing via their website the voting recommendations they make for company meetings. Now they have set out have set out six best practice principles for corporate governance advisors, as follows:

  • Clear voting policy guidelines should be made available to clients, the companies whom the adviser is monitoring and to the market;
  • Clear audit trail and explanation of the process for assessing companies and making voting recommendations should be available to clients and the companies monitored;
  • Possible conflicts of interest should be disclosed to clients and to companies monitored and, where necessary, to market regulators (i.e. paid consulting with companies);
  • Companies monitored should be given reasonable opportunity to comment on voting recommendations made and the basis of such recommendations;
  • Voting agencies should routinely report to clients on actions taken on their behalf;
  • All voting recommendations made by a voting adviser should be publicly disclosed post-meeting. (Corporate governance agencies: the need for transparent voting decisions by Tom Powdrill on Responsible Investor, 2/18/10)

The Securities and Exchange Commission Investor Advisory Committee will meet in DC on February 22 at 9 a.m. The agenda for the meeting includes consideration of a Committee recusal policy, a report from the Education Subcommittee, including a presentation on the National Financial Capability Survey, a report from the Investor as Purchaser Subcommittee, including a discussion of fiduciary duty and mandatory arbitration, a report from the Investor as Owner Subcommittee, including recommendations for the Committee on Regulation FD and proxy voting transparency, as well as reports on a work plan for environmental, social, and governance disclosure and on financial reform legislation, and discussion of next steps and closing comments. I’ll be tuning into the webcast if time permits.

The Conference Board issued a new report, Directors’ Duties under the New SEC Rules on Disclosure Enhancement, available to members. From my quick review, the report appears comprehensive but written clearly and in an easy to understand format. Highly recommended for directors, their advisors and monitors. Additionally, the SEC posted six new Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations 116.07, 117.05; 119.21, 119.22 and 119.23, which offer guidance on disclosure under Items 401, 402(a), and Item 402(c) of Regulation S-K. Staff also added new question 121A.01 related to Exchange Act Form 8-K, which explains calculation of the four-business day filing period for disclosing the results of a shareholder vote. See also  guidance on the new requirements from Compliance Week issued in January and December as well as the original rule. Additional guidance from the Altman Group, Walking the Tightrope – New Proxy Disclosures on Director Qualifications, Board Risk Oversight and Board Diversity – and new Climate Change Disclosures for the 10K.

The Corporate Library’s ‘2010 Proxy Season Foresights #3: The Growth of Clawback Provisions, ($15) found that the number of companies with clawback provisions continued to increase in 2009, and almost half of such companies are smaller-cap firms outside the Russell 1000.

The Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) is organising its 8th International Corporate Governance Conference on Wednesday 23rd June 2010, to be held at the University of Birmingham, UK.  The theme of the conference is ‘Corporate Governance and Sustainability’. Keynote speakers include Colin Melvin (Chief Executive, Hermes Equity Ownership Services Ltd), Dr Michael Blowfield (University of Oxford) and Dr Beate Sjåfjell (University of Oslo). Sir Adrian Cadbury, the CCGR’s External Advisor, will be attending the event. Papers are invited on issues relating to any area of corporate governance and sustainability. Papers should be sent as an electronic copy in PDF format, by 31st March 2010 to Karen Hanson.

Moxy Vote is running a series, Here’s to the many pioneers!, Part 1 includes yours truly, Jim McRitchie, along with Mark Latham, Andy Eggers and Matt Keenan. Part 2 will include Glyn Holton, Nell Minow, and the Social Investment Forum. I’m blushing to be in such company. Thanks to Mark Schlegal and to all the fine work at Moxy Vote for facilitating involvement by retail investors and providing advocates such an important pipeline of influence.

The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) published a White Paper, The OBO/NOBO Distinction in Beneficial Ownership: Implications for Shareowner Communications and Voting, authored by Alan Beller and Janet Fisher of the law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.  Mr. Beller is a former Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance. From the Executive Summary:

The SEC is likely to be cautious in seeking to change the current framework in significant ways, at least in the near term. Defining the objective is critical to developing a proposal. If the goal is to increase the ability of shareowners and companies to communicate directly, a number of incremental steps may be taken to address the OBO/NOBO distinction and facilitate direct distribution of proxy materials, without discarding the current distribution platform. Such an approach could lead to meaningful improvements, without seriously affecting the interests of many of the participants in the current framework, and we believe it has a greater chance of widespread support than more radical alternatives… On balance, we believe that the immediate interest of shareowners and companies in better communications would be better and more effectively served with an incremental approach that promotes less reliance on — or eliminates altogether — the OBO/NOBO distinction and otherwise increases the potential for direct communications.

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ShareOwners.org Organizes Around Citizens United

Shareowner organizations are working together to advance a three-pronged response to the last month’s U.S. Supreme Court decision providing much greater latitude to corporations making campaign contributions:

  1. Direct engagement of management at publicly traded companies, modeled on the work done by Bruce Freed at the Center for Political Accountability and a number of institutional shareholders, as well as under the guidelines of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). That engagement through shareholder resolutions and one-on-one company “dialogues” typically involves (1) disclosure of a company’s soft money contributions, payments to trade associations and other tax exempt organizations used for political purposes, and grassroots lobbying expenditures; (2) disclosure of a company’s policies and procedures for political contributions and expenditures; (3) identification of persons participating in decision-making on the contributions and expenditures, and (4) board oversight of the company’s political contributions and expenditures.
  2. Outreach to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through both the Investor Advisory Committee and a direct petition requesting SEC rulemaking in this area.
  3. A letter to Congress from the shareholder community asking lawmakers to ensure that shareholders have all tools they need to ensure that decisions about political spending by public companies does not erode shareholder value and the long term sustainability of the company.

More information available at ShareOwners.org.  Can shareowners wrench control over the corporations they own before managers consolidate their already often dominate positions over boards and Congress? Will company funds pour into political campaigns that benefit a broad base of long-term shareowners whose interests are closely aligned with that of the whole nation, or will they be used to reinforce a greedy few?

Robert A.G. Monks said: “The bad news is that Citizens United represents the worst judicial decision since Dred Scott; the good news is that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is such a thing as corporate democracy. Now is the time for shareholders to put that democracy to work to protect their own interests against boards that may want to ‘play politics’ and have no clue as to how to do so without devaluing their companies.”

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CII Supports SEC Effort to Increase Potential Liability at Credit Rating Agencies

The SEC is considering a proposal to rescind an exemption that would cause Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations to be included in the liability scheme for experts set forth in Section 11, as is currently the case for credit rating agencies that are not NRSROs.

NRSROs “have generally escaped accountability for their shoddy performance and poorly managed conflicts of interest, at least in part because of their statutory exemption from liability. Rule 436(g) shields only those few rating agencies designated as NRSROs from liability as experts for making untrue or misleading statements when their ratings are included in registration statements,” according to the Council of Institutional Investors.

CII believes effective reform of the credit ratings industry hinges on the following steps:

  • Enhanced SEC oversight
  • Reduced reliance on ratings by all market participants
  • Strengthened internal controls of NRSROs
  • Expanded transparency of credit ratings
  • Heightened standards of accountability for NRSROs

See CII’s letter to the SEC in support of Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the Securities Act (File Number: S7-25-09) (see also Concept Release No. 33-9071A). SEC Fact Sheet. Speech by Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar.

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Guest Commentary From Glyn Holton: Emergency at Intel

Intel Corp. recently announced they will no longer hold annual shareholder meetings. Instead, they plan to host shareholder forums, or “virtual shareholder meetings.” In 2000, Delaware enacted legislation allowing corporations to do exactly this. Arrogantly, that state’s legislators granted shareholders no say in the matter, leaving the decision solely to the discretion of corporation’s entrenched boards.

There is every reason to believe that, with strong safeguards, virtual shareholder meetings could enhance shareholder participation in meetings while protecting—even restoring—shareholder rights that have atrophied over the decades. However, no such safeguards are in place. Intel and other smaller corporations are taking a go-it-alone approach, forcing virtual shareholder meetings on unhappy shareholders. After Delaware changed its laws, the Council of Institutional Investors wrote the CEOs of all Delaware corporations asking them not to conduct virtual meetings. Unions have expressed concerns. Walden Asset Management has encouraged shareholders to write letters to Intel.

Here are just a few scenarios illustrating how virtual meetings will deprive shareholders:

  1. A well known shareholder activist plans to ask some pointed questions at the shareholder meeting, but his connection to the meeting somehow fails. He is left wondering if he was targeted or if there truly was an honest technical problem.
  2. A shareholder wants to challenge the chair’s conduct of the meeting with a point of order. She is within her rights to do so and may interrupt the chair for this purpose, but she finds that the electronic forum software won’t allow her to do so ….. one more shareholder right lost.
  3. A shareholder wants to make a floor amendment, but the software doesn’t allow that either.
  4. The meeting software provides no means of group communication, such as applause of booing, so shareholders come away from meetings with no sense of how other shareholders felt.
  5. Corporate executives decide to pre-record their comments for a virtual shareholder meeting, including answers to pre-selected “shareholder questions.” The executives then don’t bother logging in during the actual “meeting.”

Most annual meetings are heavily scripted. The chance for real interaction often comes in informal encounters before and after the formal meeting. Those opportunities will also be gone with virtual meetings.

Shareholders have been discussing what might be an appropriate response to Intel’s move, but there are few attractive options. The SEC will not intervene to preempt a Delaware law. We could launch a withhold vote campaign against the directors of Intel and other corporations that host electronic-only meetings. That would entail participating in—and thereby accepting as legitimate—the virtual meetings.

We reject Delaware’s law in the same way abolitionists rejected the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision in 1857. A corporation that doesn’t hold shareholder meetings is dead in the same way that a human being that doesn’t breathe is dead. Putting up a website and calling it a “meeting” doesn’t change that.

This is a crisis because the problem is going to spread. Working with Jim McRitchie of CorpGov.netand other interested parties, the United States Proxy Exchange (USPX) is exploring whether to launch a withhold proxy campaign against Intel and other corporations that adopt electronic-only meetings. Under such a campaign, shareholders would refuse to participate in those “meetings” on the grounds that they are illegitimate. Shareholders would withhold their proxies. If enough did so, offending corporations would fail to achieve quorum. Because retail brokers will vote “routine” matters, such as management sponsored resolutions, it won’t be enough for investors to not return their proxy materials. They will have to explicitly ask their broker to withhold a proxy on their behalf.

If we decide to proceed with a withhold proxy campaign, we will implement a web portal through which institutional and retail shareholders may join the campaign and coordinate their activities. At this early stage, please e-mail Glyn Holton to express support or ask questions. We will then keep you informed of developments.

Note from CorpGov.net publisher: See also virtual meetings Virtual Shareholder Meetings by Elizabeth Boros. The USPX aims to be a chamber of commerce, representing the legitimate interests of shareholders and is in the process of getting 501(c)(6) status with the Internal Revenue Code. The board set dues at $9 a month. Membership benefits include advocacy, web-based resources, and a magazine to be launched this Spring. Step up to the plate and e-mail Glyn Holton to become a member.

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February 2009 Special News Supplement: Corporate Governance Roundup 2009

Yippee-i-o-ki-ay! From the conference flyer, I half expected Will Pryor, Director of the IAFF Local 10Ehnes14 and conference “go-to” guy, to show up in chaps, especially with his e-mail encouraging attendees to dress casually. Well, maybe next year. Suits and jackets prevailed in the fashion arena but there was little in the way of pretense as funds from all over California and beyond shared mostly proxy strategies. The conference was also well attended by consultants, service providers and investment advisors. Jack Ehnes (right) was the emcee and set the tone for moderators by keeping everyone on track and additing insights, without dominating the conversation.

Session One

The fist panel was composed of Bill McGrew of CalPERS, Ann Sheehan of CalSTRS (left), and John Wilson of TIAA-CREF, ASheehanmoderated by Ralph Whitworth of Relational Investors. I was a little surprised to learn that TIAA-CREF, with more than twice the assets of CalPERS, has about half as many staff working on corporate governance issues. (6 vs 11) Maybe the bigger you are, the less you need to spend to influence outcomes. Each discussed their fund’s proxy policies and initiatives. Since I live near Sacramento and am more familiar with CalPERS and CalSTRS, I paid more attention to Wilson discussing TIAA-CREF’s collaborative approach.

They don’t look at themselves as “activists” but as moderates, engaging in private dialogue, using a non-prescriptive approach but having influence behind the scenes. With holdings in about 7,000 companies, they view themselves as universal owners and all that entails, focusing more on driving changes in the market vs at individual companies. Their efforts can largely be broken into three areas: proxy voting, corporate engagement, and thought leadership. Wilson made one of the stronger arguments at the conference that divestment simply allows companies to profit from genocide in Sudan, for example, by selling shares to investors who don’t care. TIAA-CREF emphasizes reputational risk to companies in situations where they aren’t open to other arguments. (Although in the case of the Sudan, it is now mostly Asian companies that continue operating there.)

All three giant funds emphasized their relationship with CII, ICGN, global reporting initiative and other national and international organizations. All are concerned with executive pay and agreed the problem is more the rationale of the pay package, not so much the size. Pay needs to be structured in a way that it can’t be gamed. It should encourage sustainable development of the company. All support proxy access, as did just about everyone at the event.

Session Two

This was a short session with two panelists: Ann Yeger of CII (below, right) and Allen MacDougal of PIRC, HKimmoderated by Hank Kim of NCPERS (left). Is your public pension fund under attack? See Lies, Lies and More Attacks on Pension Plans, as well as other publications from NCPERS.

Yerger discussed CII’s efforts and involvement in economic reforms. For example, the Investors’ Working Group (IWG), led by William Donaldson, and Arthur Levitt Jr., both former SEC chairs. The non-partisan panel of experts is co-sponsored by CII and
the CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity. An initial report and
recommendations are expected by late spring. In April, CII expects to release a white paper commissioned by their credit rating
agencies subcommittee. I liked this phrase from a handout: “The ability to attract capital and investors, not just listings, is what makes markets competitive… investor interests should always come first.” Top concerns for CII were identified as:Yerger

  • majority voting for directors
  • proxy access
  • broker voting eliminated
  • independent board chairs
  • independent compensation consultants
  • say on pay
  • clawback provisions for unearned bonuses
  • no pay for failure – termination for poor performance

MacDougal (below left), from PIRC went on to discuss “a way out of the crisis.” He brought up the need for asset managers to be subordinate to fund trustees and the need for trustees to get involved in market reform. He also mentioned the United Kingdom Shareholders Association (known as “UKSA”), formed in 1992 to support and to represent the views of private (ie. non institutional) shareholders. UKSA provides investment education and conveys the views of investors to the boards of British companies, to the MacDougallGovernment, to the Stock Exchange, to the media and to other bodies. Wouldn’t it be grand to have something like this in the US?

He also brought up an organization that arose to help get qualified independent directors on boards. ProNed was established in 1981 by the Bank of England, following a series of banking crises in the 1970s. Yes, somewhat similar to what we now face in 2009. With proxy access likely to be granted soon, it would be great to see a clearinghouse like this in the US. Shareowner groups seem much more likely to take action if they can easily coalesce around director candidates already vetted by shareowners. There’s a ProNed in Australia. I’m not sure how involved shareowners are in it, or even how involved they were in the original.

A few of MacDougal’s other ideas involved independence of compensation and audit consultants, collective funding by investors of the effects of incentives on behavior (with regards pay), employee representatives on boards would provide another avenue of oversight (as in European countries), additional investor representation is needed in government commissions and regulatory bodies, and he favors mandatory voting disclosure for all fund managers. “We need to be radical AND practical,” he said. I say, we need to get more speakers, like MacDougal, from outside the US with a fresh perspective. I’m glad he made the long trip for the event.

Session Three

Ralph Whitworth, of Relational Investors, Denis Johnson, of Shamrock Capital, Scott Zdrazil of Amalgamated Bank and Mike Ibarra of Landon Butler presented their investment opportunities, proxy strategies and practices. Dan Pedrotty of the AFL-CIO moderated. Relational Investors and Shamrock take stakes in just a few companies. Relational focuses on:

  • business strategy (long-term value, mitigating risk),
  • capital allocation to maximize return,
  • capital structure (optimal use of debt/equity),
  • governance (transparent, responsive, accountable),
  • board composition (diverse, independent, engaged),
  • compensation (LT alignment, reinforce strategy and risk mgt.),
  • communication (timely, accurate, consistent, realistic)

During thDenis Johnsone Q&A, Whitworth said he doesn’t favor more rights for long-term investors. I haven’t heard anyone from these types of funds who does. I suppose when a fund makes a commitment of time and effort, they want to be heard right away, not ignored for the first few years.

Shamrock’s strategy was similar, although Johnson (left) placed more emphasis on removing anti-takeover provisions and providing shareowners the ability to call a special meeting. Shareowners need to accept more responsibility for removing ineffective directors. Withhold votes should have been greater in the past. Shamrock will help ensure such votes will be higher in the future. Proxy voting policies should place a greater emphasis on poor relative stock performance, he says.

Scott Zdrazil, of Amalgamated Bank, emphasized their resolutions for 2009. They’ve been using resolutions to try to “move the market” since 1992. This year they have over thirty. Zdrazil highlighted the following:

  • majority vote standard for director elections
  • annual election of all directors
  • separation of CEO and chair
  • oversight and disclosure of political contributions
  • curtailing “golden coffins”
  • clawbacks for unearned compensation
  • say on pay
  • double trigger change in control provisions – to kick in, must be change of control and termination of CEO
  • ban gross-up – let CEOs pay their own taxes
  • golden parachutes
  • healthcare reforms – adopt universal principles for national healthcare reform
  • adopt ILO labor standards

Mike Ibarra, of Landon Butler, emphasized the history of their Multi-Employer Property Trust (MEPT) funded mostly by building trade unions and pensions. He described their Responsible Property Investing as comprehensive in terms of environmental, social and governance, to preserve and enhance economic returns. The MEPT claims to have created 52 million jobs through 2006 and has played a key role in revitalization and historic preservation. They’re beating the comparable indexes, so you can do well by doing good.

Session Four

After a nice lunch, we heard from the AFL-CIO, CTW/SEIU, AFSCME and LIUNA, moderated by Carolyn Widener, of CalSTRS. Dan Pedrotty, of the AFL-CIO said they will shortly issue a rating for registered investment advisors, discussed the need to reregulate capital markets, focus more on risk management, and push for greater disclosure. He then talked about some of their new proposals:

  • golden coffins
  • hold past retirement – retain 75% of comp shares until two years after termination
  • healthcare initiative – universal, continuous, affordable, high quality

Rich Clayton then discussed the focus of Change to Win and SEIU. The focus was broader than most, with initial emphasis on the Investor and Employee Free Choice Act, which is critical to ensuring that higher productivity leads to improved paychecks. He had plenty of graphs to demonstrate our new gilded age and how the increasing disparity on income and benefits has helped fuel our problems and the financial crisis. The proportion of workers wanting to join a union has risen substantially during the last 10 years but intimidation has kept them from doing so. Clayton also touched on the 2009 resolutions being introduced by SEIU’s Capital Stewardship Program. These include:

  • say on pay
  • climate risk and greenhouse emission targets
  • labor standards / ILO compliance
  • regulatory reforms
    • proxy access
    • say on pay, and other exec compensation reforms
    • ending broker votes
    • ESG disclosure and clarification of fiduciary standards
    • reinvigorating long-term ownership discussions

Scott Adams described AFSCME’s top three governance priorities as say on pay, proxy access and vote no or withhold campaigns on directors. They will continue pushing majority vote requirements, board declassification, anti-gross ups, and in attempting provisions to recover solicitation expenses. New initiatives this year are requirements to hold equity shares for several years in escrow and to delete golden coffins. They are also working on reforms to reconstruct bond rating agencies.

Richard Metcalf then described LIUNA’s program. They seem to make more of an effort than most (TIAA-CREF in this bunch excepted) to engage companies before filing. They are using a questionnaire to determine if companies have done adequate succession planning. Turnover of CEOs has increased and there is a growing trend of looking to the outside (presumably for a savior). We’ve seen high exposure misfires, such as at Home Depot. They’re also disturbed by conflicts of interest among executive compensation consultants. LIUNA is seeking annual performance reviews by the board, development of criteria for internal candidates, planning three years in advance and annual disclosures on succession planning. He also described efforts to limit the SEC’s “ordinary business” exclusion, which has been used to exclude proposals like those submitted by LIUNA in 2006 seeking evaluation of risk at mortgage lending by home builders. Others thrown out sought to draw attention to credit rating conflicts, succession planning and evaluation of risk. He quoted former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, “It is impossible for the SEC to determine what the ordinary business of a corporation really is.”

Session Five

The final session saw brief presentations from Glass Lewis, Corpgov.net, ICCR, and the RiskMetrics Group. Bob McCormick of Glass Lewis led off with a comprehensive presentation that touched on the credit crisis, executive compensation, majority vote for directors, say on pay, M&A, contests, the new administration, initiatives from 2008 and those we will see in 2009. The loss of broker votes, combined with majority requirements, will make a difference in director elections. In his handout, McCormick discusses the Waxman Report on Conflicts of Interest Among Compensation Consultants, which found that almost half of the S&P 500 got executive pay advice from conflicted consultants. Another issue he raised that has been too little discussed is redomestications to lower corporate tax rates. Apparently, several are or were looking to Switzerland. For 2009, he discussed many of the same proposals already mentioned above and the likelihood of SEC and Congressional support for proxy access, eliminating broker votes, say on pay, compensation consultant conflicts, etc.

You can pull up a four-up pdf of my presentation, IncreaseVotingClout4 at and a copy of my very brief paper at corpgov.net/news/2009/GRU.doc. My hope is to generate additional interest and involvement in Proxy Democracy and the Investor Suffrage Movement. If you get inspired or have questions, please contact me. At Proxy Democracy we are primarily seeking funds willing to post their votes in advance of annual meetings; including the reason(s) for votes would be even better. ProxyDemocracy will soon beta test the ability of retail shareowners to vote directly through the site based on information posted there, including votes by trusted funds. At the Investor Suffrage Movement we are developing a network of people willing to present shareowner proposals locally, saving proponents, such as public pension funds, substantial expenses for time and travel. We are also helping shareowners write proposals, defend them against no action requests and, as mentioned, present them at annual meetings.

Laura Berry (left) then gave an impassioned presentation on the Interfaith Center on Corporate ResponsibilityLaura Berry. “Inspired by Faith. Committed to Action.” ICCR represents about 300 faith-based institutional investors with over $100 billion in invested capital. She emphasized how their prophetic voice has anticipated emerging areas of corporate responsibility. Over many years prior to the recent market collapse, they introduced 120 resolutions on subprime lending and securitization. Resolutions allow them to begin a conversation and to educate. This year, they filed 292 resolutions but engaged in 350 dialogues. They introduced some on governance issues, such as executive pay, but many more on social issues, such as: adopt human rights policy, reduce emissions, recycle, health care reform. They are making good use of data developed by Trucost to determine which companies to target on climate risk indicators. One example of their successes is that WalMart is now boycotting Uzbekistan cotton over its use of force child labor during harvest. I have bulletins from ICCR going back a dozen years and, of course, they’ve been around since the early 1970s.

The finCBowieal presentation of the day was from Carol Bowie (right) of the RiskMetrics Group. She described their elaborate process to develop policies and requested feedback on information posted on their Policy Gateway, a really great resource. She also highlighted some of the key policy updates for 2009. I’ve got resolutions in at companies to reincorporate to North Dakota because of their shareowner friendly policies, and was a bit disappointed that RMG is taking a case-by-case approach on such resolutions… better than opposing them all. RMG has come out with a strong bias in favor of pay resolutions calling on executives to hold until retirement and “bonus banking,” holding for years. It appears they are taking a much harder look at executive pay, with revised performance tests. Say on pay factors include:

  • alignment of incentive plan metrics with business goals (something which few CD&As address)
  • peer group benchmarking process
  • performance trend vs. pay trends
  • internal pay disparity
  • balance of fixed vs. performance-based pay
  • poor pay practices
  • information/rationales in CD&A regarding pay determination
  • board’s responsiveness to investor input

See also Hot Proxy Season Topics for 2009 and Explorations in Executive Compensation.

All in all, it was a great conference, close to the airport (less hassle), low key and very informative. Sorry for all the clipped head shots. Next year I’ll bring a camera. I went to a similar conference about 15 years ago in Oakland and there were only about twenty people attending, as I recall. This time there were about 150. Next year, I’m sure attendance will be in the hundreds. Three cheers to the Los Angeles Pension Trustees Network for sponsoring the event.

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October 2002

Webster Named

The US Securities and Exchange Commission voted to approve five members of a new national accounting oversight board to be headed by ex-FBI-CIA chief William Webster whose only experience in accounting, as far as we know, was heading the auditing committee of U.S. Technologies, now bankrupt and facing fraud accusations. Shortly before Webster was appointed he told Harvey Pitt but Pitt chose not to tell the other four commissioners prior to their vote.

Webster edged out the much better qualified pension fund chief John Biggs, who would have done much to restore trust. The vote was 3-2. Webster becomes the first chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, expected to get up and running early next year.

In addition to Webster, the commission approved former CalPERS attorney Kayla Gillan; accountant and former SEC general counsel Daniel Goelzer; former congressman Willis Gradison; and SEC Enforcement Division Chief Accountant Charles Neimeier. Continue Reading →

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Archives: October 1997

Stern Stewart’s EVA product got a boost when CalPERS adopted its use in creating their annual focus list. It should help CalPERS pinpoint their targets with better accuracy and may result in increasing the “CalPERS Effect.” In other CalPERS news, they voted 36% of the time against executive stock plans and 39% of the time against exec bonus plans during the 1996-97 season. They voted in favor of management proposals 78% of the time and against 57% of shareholder proposals. Continue Reading →

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