FedEx $FDX, which provides transportation, e-commerce, and business services in the United States and internationally, is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 9/29/2014. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three funds when I checked on 9/20/2014. I voted with management 42% of the time and assigned them a proxy score of 42. View Proxy Statement. Read Warnings below. What follows are my recommendations on how to vote the FedEx 2014 proxy in order to enhance corporate governance and long-term value. Continue Reading →
Tag Archives | proxy access
In February, I reported that prospects were looking up at nano-cap CSP, Inc. (CSPI), one of the companies in my portfolio. See CSP Inc. (CSPI): How I Voted – Proxy Score 100. CSPI completed a number of reforms, including declassifying the Board. In addition, CSPI started paying a dividend and adopted a mandatory retirement age of 75 for directors, leading to some board refreshment. However, since then the NASDAQ has gone up by about 9%, while CSPI stock has gone down about 3%. I am a long-term investor, so am willing to give the current board more time to demonstrate their performance.
At the same time it is better to take preventive measures by continuing to improve corporate governance BEFORE problems arise. There is no more fundamental measure to ensure the Board’s accountability to shareowners than proxy access. Continue Reading →
The State Board of Administration of Florida (Florida SBA) is the fourth largest public pension fund in the US and was early to announce their votes in advance of annual meetings. Those announcements can be found on the Florida SBA site, as well as on Proxy Democracy. The following is from a press release that Florida SBA issued out last week on their accomplishments during the recent proxy season. They certainly did a lot to shift us to more democratic forms of corporate governance. Congratulations to Ash Williams, Michael McCauley and all those working at Florida SBA. Continue Reading →
Last year I introduced a proxy access proposal at Reeds (REED) calling on the Board to allow 1% shareowners holding for two years to place their director nominees (up to 24% of the board) on the proxy. It also would have allowed a party of 25 or more $2,000 one year shareowners to place an equal number of nominees on the proxy. Since Reeds had a five member board, the proposal would have allowed for up to two shareowner nominees from two non-coordinating parties. Continue Reading →
Corporate Governance Publisher’s Note: Yes, you’ll find many broken links in the material referenced below. After 5, 10 and 15 years, the internet moves on. Many of the organization’s linked have since gone under. We’re just glad to still be here, offering our readers a sense of the history we have shared. More about the WABAC machine.
Five Years Ago in Corporate Governance
This morning, the SEC held a hearing on proxy access. By a three to two vote, Commissioners voted for proxy access. Democracy in corporate governance will dramatically improve with our right to nominate and elect directors, even if limited to 25% of the board. Directors may actually begin to feel dependent on the will of shareowners. Continue Reading →
Goldman Sachs Group $GS, is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 5/16/2014. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of two funds when I checked and voted on 5/11/2014. I voted with management 31% of the time. View Proxy Statement. Read Warnings below.
Citigroup Inc $C, is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 4/22/2014. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of no funds when I checked and voted on 4/15/2014. I voted with management 33% of the time. View Proxy Statement. Why an index with no links? That seems so basic. Perhaps Citi doesn’t want to make reading the proxy easy? Continue Reading →
The deadline for voting online is April 21st. My proposal, #8 on Citi’s proxy (page 97), would bring proxy access (page 40) to our company by allowing shareowners to place board nominees on Citi’s proxy. Don’t be fooled by Citi’s opposition statement, which calls the ownership thresholds “low.” In reality, 1% of Citi is huge; about $1.4B.
The largest shareowners at Citi, Vanguard and SSgA have never initiated an activist campaign but they might vote for candidates put forward by other investors. Public pensions are more likely to take the activist role and nominate candidates. The four largest public pension funds combined — CalPERS (35%), New York State Common (0.33%), CalSTRS (0.18%), and Florida SBA (0.17%) — would barely hold enough shares to nominate three board members directors under my proposal. Continue Reading →
The Walt Disney Company, $DIS, is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 3/18/2014. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three funds when I checked and voted on 3/9/2014. I voted with management 60% of the time. View Proxy Statement. Continue Reading →
Apple Inc. (NASD:AAPL) is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is coming up on 2/28/2014. ProxyDemocracy.org was down for maintenance when I checked and voted on 2/19/2014, so no voting advice there. I checked a few other sources such as CalPERS, Florida SBA and OTPP but none had disclosed their votes on their sites as of yesterday. I voted with 89% of the Board’s recommendations. View Apple’s Proxy Statement. Continue Reading →
Despite the Apple Board’s best effort to obtain a “no-action” letter to exclude my proxy access proposal, it is included among the items to be voted on at or before the annual meeting to be held on February 28 at our Company’s principal executive offices in Cupertino, CA. See Apple’s proxy, Proxy Proposal 11, ‘Proxy Access for Shareholders’ on page 63. (A minor gripe – why doesn’t Apple provide a linked index to our proxy so that shareholders can easily flip to the subject they are looking for? Let’s hope part of their strategy isn’t making it too hard to analyze the issues and vote.)
Here’s the thrust of my argument. We need directors who can address the big money pile – not with short-term buyback strategies that facilitate extraction of value but with long-term strategies that create value. Investing $150B in Treasuries or money markets is not efficient use of our money. The returns of Google Ventures, for example, are far above the industry’s mean. There is no reason why Apple couldn’t also put our money to good use though an Apple Ventures type of vehicle or through a revamped and enhanced Blue Sky program. Continue Reading →
Reeds, Inc $REED; you read the Proxy, the crazy Preliminary Proxy, and the rationale for proxy access. You’ve seen the movie, where I explained the need for proxy access Now, don’t forget to vote! The annual meeting is December 20, 2013. According to ProxyVote.com, Internet voting is accepted up to 11:59 p.m. (ET) the day before the meeting/cut off date. That’s Thursday! Below are my proxy recommendations. Continue Reading →
In mid-July I e-mailed investor relations at Reeds Inc. $REED (IR@reedsinc.com) asking if REED had a classified board or plurality requirements for director elections. Can shareowners call a special meeting or act by written consent? What supermajority requirements are in place re M&A or other actions? No response. This surprised and disappointed me since they were prompt in answering previous e-mails: Make kombucha; we’re already working on it. Try one with coconut water and ginger; good idea. Where can I find Reeds Kombucha in Sacramento?; here’s a list.
According to FactSet Research Systems, “insider/stake ownership” at REED is 33.5% of the company’s float. Being almost a controlled company, maybe they don’t feel the need to respond to inquiries from ‘outside’ shareowners about the firm’s corporate governance. They not only didn’t answer me, they blocked me from following their Twitter feed. Maybe management and the current board think the less outside shareowners know, the better for them? Continue Reading →
Publisher’s Note: Yes, you’ll find many broken links in the material referenced below. After 5, 10 and 15 years, the internet moves on. Many of the organization’s linked have since gone under. We’re just glad to still be here, offering our readers a sense of the history we have shared. More about the WABAC machine.
Five Years Ago in Corporate Governance
- The Treasury is injecting $125 billion into nine big banks and making a like amount available for other banks that apply. Those financial giants owed their executives more than $40 billion for past years’ pay and pensions as of the end of 2007, a Wall Street Journal analysis shows. (Banks Owe Billions to Executives, 10/31/08) How much of our $250 billion bailout will go to pay for special executive pensions and deferred compensation, including bonuses? Will our disgust with those who brought us the financial melt-down lead to an upsurge in mutual banks and credit unions?
- Jackie Cook, the founder of Fund Votes, told SocialFunds.com, “Executive compensation is at the heart of a growing problem Continue Reading →
I have a ‘no-action’ request by Apple on my desk. They are fighting my attempt to include consideration of a proxy access proposal at their next annual meeting. Like most no-action requests to the SEC, this one is full of dry uninspired attempts to raise procedural minutiae as a basis for exclusion. Also sitting on my desk is the latest issue of Directors&Boards with the following sentence in huge type on the cover: Should You Serve on an Activist’s Slate?”
That looks a lot more interesting. Apple can wait. Won’t it be nice, I think, when boards welcome proxy access, the new ideas and candidates that are likely to follow? Let’s see what they have to say at Directors&Boards. Continue Reading →